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 One of the most striking signs of globali-
zation is the strong growth in foreign direct
investment (FDI) during the last two
decades, and particularly since the second
half of the 1980s. This trend has also spurred
a lot of research on the issue of foreign
investment and firms’ choice of entry mode
in foreign markets in general. Important
questions are: What motivates firms to
undertake an investment abroad? What kind
of investment should it choose; the
acquisition of an existing plant or a the
establishment of a new production facility?
When the alternative mode of servicing a
foreign market is exports, how does economic
integration in the form of reduced inter-
national trade costs affect entry mode? What
are the effects of the various forms of market
entry on the countries in which the foreign
firms operate? In what ways can potential
“host” countries attract foreign investment
and make the most out of the presence of
foreign firms or foreign sales? 
The ambition of the present paper is to
shed light on these very important questions.
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When a firm wishes to sell in a foreign market, it can do so either by exporting to
that market or by investing in a local production unit. The latter mode of servicing
a foreign market is referred to as a foreign direct investment (FDI). International
production has increased rapidly during the last two decades, and particularly
since the second half of the 1980s. This paper describes the facts, explains why
firms choose FDI, and evaluates FDI in terms of impact on host economies.
Particular emphasis is placed on firms’ choice between the two types of foreign
investment; “greenfields”, which involves the establishment of a new production
facility, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions, which involves taking over an
existing production unit in a foreign market. The paper also contains a fairly
extensive discussion of the consequences of economic integration on market
entry. JEL-codes: F23, L13, O14recent trends. We then ask what motivates
firms may have to undertake FDI. In the
following section we apply the theory on
issues related to FDI, and then move on to
host country effects and policy implications.
The final section concludes. 
Facts
FDI defined
FDI is an investment made to acquire a lasting
interest in a foreign enterprise with the
purpose of having an effective voice in its
management. The OECD and IMF interpret
“an effective voice” to involve the possession
of ten percent or more of the ordinary shares
of a corporate enterprise by one owner. Alter-
natively, if no single owner has 10 percent or
more of the shares, the criterion is that a group
of investors controls more than 50 percent of
the shares. There is however no international
consensus on the minimum equity stake.
Partly for this reason, countries differ in their
definitions of FDI.1
Note that in addition to new equity and
loans from parent firms, reinvested earnings
in the foreign affiliates are also registered as
FDI. In addition, foreign affiliates may raise
money in the host country or in international
capital markets. These modes of expanding
foreign affiliates’ activities are however not
registered as FDI. 
FDI may involve either the establishment
of a new production facility, a so-called
“greenfield” investment, or a purchase of
(shares in) an existing foreign firm, a cross
border acquisition, in the statistics often
reported under the heading “M&A” for
“mergers and acquisitions”. In case a firm
acquires more than 50 percent of the shares
in the acquired firm, this is a “majority
M&A”, and in case it acquires less, it is a
“minority M&A”.
FDI should be contrasted with portfolio
investments. By definition, a portfolio invest-
ment involves a smaller ownership share in
the company in which an investment has
been made. The time horizon of a portfolio
investment is often short term, which also
means that this kind of capital is much more
sensitive to short term fluctuations in the
host economies than is FDI. Typically,
portfolio investors are institutional investors,
such as pension funds, trust funds, and life
insurance companies. These investors are
passive, in the sense that they do not take
part in the management of the company they
have invested in. FDI on the other hand is
generally undertaken by large, multinational
enterprises (MNEs) with a clear ambition of
using their ownership position to exercise
control.
FDI should also be contrasted with
strategic partnerships and licensing agree-
ments, non-equity relations that have been
growing in importance recently. Technology
partnerships have been formed in information
technology and pharmaceutical and auto-
mobile industries in the 1990s. The purpose
of these partnerships has been to reduce both
the competitive pressure in the market and
the costs and risks associated with R&D.
International networks of this kind are not
captured by traditional measures of inter-
national production, such as FDI.
(UNCTAD, 1999a: 8)
Global growth in FDI
During the last two decades, and particularly
since the end of the 1980s, we have witnessed
a strong increase in foreign direct investment,
both in absolute terms and relative to trade.2
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1.  On international differences in definition of FDI, and a discussion of data on FDI, see Dunning (1993), Ch.1.In fact, the growth in FDI, at a yearly average
of 23 percent since 1986, has been twice that
of trade. Today, 25 percent of global value
added takes place in multinational enter-
prises. And one third of the MNEs value
added is created in foreign affiliates. In
Canada and Ireland foreign affiliates account
for over 50 percent of manufacturing
production (OECD, 1998: 21). 
Sales from the foreign affiliates ($11
trillion in 1998) exceed that of global exports
($7 trillion in 1998), implying that inter-
national production is a more important
means of delivering goods and services to
foreign markets than is trade. Moreover, intra-
firm trade, i.e., international trade between
various units within the same MNE,
constitutes a substantial share (30 percent) of
world trade.
Multinationals tend to be important in
knowledge-intensive sectors, characterized by
high levels of R&D relative to sales, a large
share of highly skilled workers, new and/or
technically complex products, and high levels
of product differentiation and advertising.
Examples of such industries include elec-
tronics, automotive, computers, and chemi-
cals. Major MNEs in these industries include
General Electric (the largest MNE in the
world), Ford Motor Company (the second
largest), IMB (the seventh largest), and
Hoechst AG (the 13th largest).3
FDI growth has been particularly strong
in the service sector. Today, nearly half of the
world’s FDI stock is in services. Growth in
FDI in services has been mainly in the form
of mergers and acquisitions, notably in sectors
such as banking, insurance, and telecom-
munications. In fact, more than half of all
cross-border mergers and acquisitions during
the period 1991–1998 took place in service
industries. In manufacturing, accounting for
40% of cross-border mergers and acquisi-
tions, industries such as petroleum,
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and automotive
have also seen some major mergers. Recent
examples include British Petroleum-Amoco
in the petroleum industry, Daimler-Benz-
Chrysler in the automotive industry, and
Astra AB-Zeneca Group Plc in pharma-
ceuticals (Kang and Johansson, 2000: 20).
As is evident from Table 1, the growth in
cross-border mergers and acquisitions has
been very strong in the second half of the
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2.  For an historic overview of the development of MNEs, see Dunning (1993), chapter 5. Unless otherwise indi-
cated, the information in this section is gathered from UNCTAD’s World Investment Report, various years.
3.  UNCTAD’s World Investment Report ranks the world’s 50 largest non-financial MNEs.
Table 1.  Growth of FDI 
Value at current prices Annual growth rate
1982 1990 1999 1986–-90 1991–95 1996–99 1998 1999
FDI 58 209 865 24 20 32 44 27
M&A . .  151 720 26 23 47 74 35
Source: UNCTAD (2000) Table 4, page 5. 
Note: Values in billion dollars. Growth rates in percentages. Data on cross-border M&A available from 1987
onwards.1990s. In 1999, mergers accounted for more
than 80 percent of global FDI.4 This means
that the addition to international production
capacity is far less than that implied by the
value of annual FDI flows.
Developed countries accounted for about
90 percent of the worldwide majority-owned
acquisitions. In developing countries, FDI
inflows are mainly in the form of greenfield
investments. The lesser importance of
acquisitions in LDCs is partly due to the fact
that poor countries typically offer fewer
suitable firms to acquire, and partly because
of a more restrictive take-over legislation
compared to OECD countries, particularly
with respect to majority take-overs.
Note that the large share of mergers and
acquisitions in total FDI in the late 1990s is
not unprecedented. In the late 1980s this
share was also well above 60 percent. In
absolute numbers, however, both mergers and
acquisitions and FDI in general were much
larger at the end of the 1990s than a decade
earlier. Moreover, while the cross-border
mergers and acquisitions of the 1980s often
crossed industry borders, most of the recent
mergers are concentrated in the same or
related industries; the business philosophy
has changed from conglomerate building to
one emphasizing the need to focus on core
activities.
Regional distribution of FDI
The majority of FDI takes place between
major OECD countries, notably between the
EU and the USA. The EU is the largest source
of FDI, with an outflow of $510 billion in
1999, nearly two thirds of world outflows.
With foreign investments of $199 billion, the
UK in 1999 replaced the US as the world’s
largest foreign investor for the first time since
1988. EU’s share of FDI-inflows was 35
percent, and the corresponding share for the
US was 32 percent.
LDCs’ share of FDI-inflows has been
growing in the 1990s, at least up till the
financial crisis in Asia which started in the
fall of 1997. In 1990, this share was 20
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4.  UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2000, subtitled “Cross-border mergers and acquisitions and develop-
ment”, contains an in depth discussion of M&As.
Table 2. Regional distribution of FDI
Inflows Outflows
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Developed countries 63 59 59 72 74 85 84 86 92 91
Western Europe 37 3 30 37 35 49 54 51 63 64
United States 18 21 24 30 32 26 20 23 21 19
Japan - 0 1 1 2 6 6 6 4 3
Developing countries 32 38 37 26 24 15 16 14 8 8
Africa 1 2 2 1 1 0 - 0 0 0
Latin America 10 13 15 11 12 2 2 3 2 3
Asia 21 23 20 13 11 12 14 10 6 5
Source: UNCTAD (1998) Table 4, UNCTAD (1999a) Table 8, UNCTAD (2000), Annex Tables B.1 and B.2.
Note: Numbers as percentage of global FDI flows.percent, reaching 37 percent in 1997. The
majority of these investments are hosted by
the Southeast Asian countries (19 percent in
1997) and Latin America (15 percent in
1997), with Africa’s share being a modest 1.6
percent. China alone represented one third of
non-OECD inflows in the period 1990-96.
Indeed, during this period China was second
only to the US in terms of FDI inflows. 
As evident from Table 2, the share of global
FDI destined for LDCs fell due to the Asian
crisis in 1997, to 24 percent in 1999, South-
East Asia losing 10 percent and Latin America
3 percent relative to 1996. Similarly, the share
of FDI outflows from LDCs dropped from
14 percent in 1997 to 8 percent in 1999. It is
however important to note that although the
crisis led to a decline in Asia’s and Latin
America’s share of global FDI, in absolute
terms, the drop in FDI was much less
dramatic. In fact, FDI inflows to Latin
America were five percent higherin 1998 than
in 1997, even though this continent registered
a 4 percent reduction relative to global FDI
in the same period. The relatively modest
response of FDI flows to most Asian countries
in a period of deep financial and economic
crisis, is evidence of the long-term nature of
this kind of capital flows relative to portfolio
investment.5
Even if LDCs receive less FDI than the
more developed parts of the world do, the
importance of these capital flows for
developing countries is arguably greater. For
one, FDI is likely to be relatively more
important in less advanced countries as a
source of capital and technology due to
limited access to international capital markets
and small amount of domestic R&D.
Moreover, the size of LDC economies is
generally smaller than that of developed
economies. In fact, the FDI/GDP ratio is
higher in developing countries than in OECD
countries (UNCTAD, 1999a: 19). 
Explanation
In recent years we have witnessed large-scale
privatization and extensive liberalization of
international investment rules in most parts
of the world. Such policy changes are
obviously important in explaining the great
rise in global FDI: It gives multinational
companies the opportunity to invest abroad.
But in order to understand the rise in global
FDI, we must also understand why multi-
nationals find it profitable to use this
opportunity: We must search for factors that
motivateFDI. In short, we need a theory. Such
a theory must answer the following three
questions: 1) What makes a firm competitive
in foreign markets? 2) Why would a firm
choose to produce abroad? 3) Why would a
firm choose to own the foreign production
unit?
Dunning’s OLI-theory
In his widely acclaimed OLI-theory, Dunning
(1993) provides a synthesis of the answers
proposed by the literature to the three
questions raised above.6 Three conditions,
namely ownership advantages (O), location
advantages (L), and internalization advan-
tages (I), all have to be satisfied for a firm to
undertake FDI. 
Ownership advantages
A firm selling in a foreign market has certain
disadvantages relative to its local competitors.
The disadvantages could be related to langu-
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5.  For a more detailed discussion of FDI inflows to Southeast Asia, see Thomsen (1999).
6.  See also Markusen (1995) for an overview and a discussion of the OLI framework.age and cultural barriers, limited knowledge
about local tastes and institutions, etc. The
hypothesis is that given these disadvantages,
the firm operating in the foreign environment
must possess some advantage over local firms
in order for foreign production, or indeed
international sales of any kind, to be
profitable. This advantage could be in the
form of a more cost efficient production
process, a unique product, better access to
international capital market, international
marketing facilities, etc.
Location advantages
A location may offer various kinds of benefits
to firms. First, it may be home to natural
resources, such as oil, minerals, or trees, which
attract firms involved in the extraction of
these resources. This is sometimes called
resource-seeking FDI. 
Second, countries may be endowed with a
low cost, and perhaps highly qualified, labor
force. Firms seeking to reduce labor costs or
perhaps gain access to ideas and technology
may be attracted to such a location. This kind
of FDI is referred to as “vertical” or “efficiency
seeking” FDI. It is called vertical, since it
involves a geographical decentralization of
the firm’s production chain, where the
affiliates typically produce labor intensive
intermediates that are shipped back to high-
wage countries, often to the parent company
itself. The name efficiency seeking stems from
the fact that the main aim of the investment
is greater cost efficiency in production. For
instance, Japanese companies involved in
labor intensive manufacturing industries such
as electronics components, chemicals, electri-
cal appliances, and textiles have invested
heavily in neighboring countries in order to
reduce labor costs. FDI aimed at accessing
highly qualified labor in a certain area, such
as the IT-expertise in California’s Silicon
Valley, is sometimes referred to as “technology
sourcing” FDI. 
Third, a location offers proximity to local
customers. This is sometimes referred to as
“market seeking”, or “horizontal”, FDI;
“market seeking” since the aim of the invest-
ment is to supply local markets, and
“horizontal”, since the affiliate basically does
the same thing as the parent firm. By locating
in a specific area, firms save on trade costs,
such as tariffs. This rationale for FDI is
therefore sometimes referred to as the tariff-
jumping argument. If plant specific costs are
not too high relative to the foreign market size,
it may be more profitable to service foreign
markets through FDI rather than exports. 
For instance, the high tariff barriers
protecting Latin American markets from
international trade in automobiles have
contributed to a large amount of FDI in this
sector, notably in Argentina and Brazil.
Similarly, Japanese car producers have
invested in both Europe and the US in order
to service local markets. For certain kinds of
non-tradable services, such as real estate,
hotels, retail trade, telecommunication, and
part of the banking and financial sectors, there
is no tradeoff between trade and FDI at all;
market entry simply requires FDI. 
Most of the global FDI is horizontal.
Brainard (1997) reports that only 13 percent
of the overseas production of U.S. owned
foreign affiliates is shipped to the United
States, while only 2 percent of the output
produced by foreign affiliates located in the
U.S. is shipped to their parents. Not
surprisingly, vertical FDI is relatively more
important when hosted by LDCs. 
Fourth, there may be a strategic incentive
to invest abroad. We may call this “monopoly
seeking” FDI. Particularly when the
investment is in the form of an acquisition,
the market power, and therefore the profit of
the investing firm, is likely to increase (since
the number of competitors goes down). But
18 Kjetil Bjorvatnalso greenfield investments may have a
strategic motivation. Firms may wish to have
production plants in several locations because
such a presence may deter entry by potential
newcomers (Ganslandt, 1998).
Finally, low wages and a large local market
are not sufficient conditions for attracting
FDI. The public sector supplies public goods
and services and defines and implements
economic policies and all these public sector
activities affect the profitability of an invest-
ment project, whether domestic or foreign.
As an example, 16 leading MNEs operating
in India named regulatory control, bureau-
cratic intervention, and the lack of adequate
infrastructure, particularly telecommunica-
tions and transportation as major difficulties
in operating in that country.7
In relation to this last point, note that
firms not only seek business-friendly policies
at a specific point in time. More importantly,
since an investment in a particular country
involves a long-term exposure to the econo-
mic and political conditions in that country,
firms typically look for some commitment to
these policies. They need to be assured that
their investment is safe from expropriation,
that profits can be transferred out of the
country, and that potential disputes between
the host government and the multinational
firm will be solved in a fair and efficient way.
Countries with a record of economic, political
and social stability are likely to be attractive
to foreign investment. For instance,
multinationals investing in Central and
Eastern Europe listed macro-economic
stability as key to realizing the potential of
their investment (UNCTAD, 1998). Signing
international trade and investment
agreements may serve to commit to a set of
policies and to signal this commitment to the
rest of the world. Fernandez and Portes (1998:
214) argue that for Mexico, NAFTA serves
mainly as a commitment and signaling device:
Mexico joined NAFTA on rather
unfavourable terms, securing very little in
concrete tariff reductions or other
concessions from the United States.
Although this was not perceived as an
insurance premium by U.S. policymakers,
Mexican policymakers may have perceived
it as such. Again, this is particularly
relevant in the context of foreign invest-
ment. To persuade U.S. investors to take
advantage of Mexico’s low labor costs by
investing in Mexico, it was necessary to
reassure them not only that tariffs for
Mexican exports to the United States were
low but also that they would stay low and
that contingent protection would be less
likely to be imposed.
A similar argument has been offered by
Blomström and Kokko (1997b). 
Internalization advantages
In order for the MNE to choose FDI rather
than an arms-length agreement, such as
licensing or strategic partnerships, there must
exist some advantage of conducting the
business internally within the firm. These
advantages include greater control over the
technology and quality of the product. In
addition to problems tied to control of arms-
length operations, negotiating such deals may
be difficult and costly, as emphasized by
Blomström and Kokko (1997a: 8):
Markets for technology are typically
imperfect, which makes the transaction
costs for sales to outsiders high. For
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7.  Cited in UNCTAD (1994), page 83.instance, it is difficult to judge the value
of any specific technology and agree about
prices and licensing costs that are
acceptable to both parties. Consequently,
MNEs often prefer direct investment
before licensing, and the preference for
FDI may be particularly strong when the
newest and most profitable technologies
(or those that are very close to the MNEs
principal line of business) are exploited. 
Limiting the spread of technology may be
particularly difficult in many LDCs, due to
weak patent protection systems. This fact may
induce firms to avoid arms-length agreements
and choose FDI in these countries. As an
example, India banned direct investment by
Coca-Cola hoping that the company instead
would choose to license the production of its
soft drink to a local producer. The weakness
of Indian property right protection, however,
discouraged the American company from
entering into a licensing agreement, and the
company instead decided to leave the market
(Vishwasrao, 1994). In Indonesia and the
Philippines, foreign investors are required to
phase down their participation in a company
over time. Rather than adding to domestic
capabilities, the result has been a reduction in
investments and technology transfer from the
parent firm. Generally speaking, empirical
research indicates that restrictions on FDI
have not been successful in increasing
technology transfers to the host economy
(OECD, 1998a: 61-62).
Applications
In this section we discuss three issues in light
of the theoretical overview presented above.
The first issue deals with the fact that FDI is
particularly prevalent in knowledge-intensive
sectors. Can the OLI-theory explain this fact?
The second issue concerns the rise in
acquisitions. When do firms choose this form
of market entry, and can we explain its recent
rise? Finally, we focus on economic
integration and market entry. What are the
likely effects of increased market integration
on FDI? This last question has received a lot
of attention in the literature, and is also the
issue that will receive the most attention here. 
R&D, FDI, and OLI
Multinationals are often found in industries
in which products and production processes
are unique to firms, typically the result of large
investments in R&D and a large employment
of highly skilled labor. The OLI-framework
may shed light on this observation. First,
knowledge is often firm specific, for instance
in the form of patented products and produ-
ction processes. Knowledge is an ownership
advantage that may make the firm competi-
tive in world markets. Second, knowledge can
easily be transferred between countries at little
extra cost. If the firm derives its ownership
advantage from firm specific knowledge, the
costs of establishing a foreign affiliate are
probably modest, compared to a situation
where the ownership advantage is embodied
in a particular kind of machinery. Third, it
may be preferable for an R&D intensive firm
to internalize its foreign operations by
choosing FDI, rather than to enter into a
licensing agreement, in order to keep a tight
control over its technology.
In sum, the ownership, location, and
internalization advantages are all highly
relevant for R&D intensive industries. The
observed importance of FDI in these
industries is therefore in line with the predic-
tions of the theory. 
Entry mode: Greenfield versus acquisition
We have already discussed a firm’s choice
between FDI and alternative modes of
servicing foreign markets, such as exports. In
20 Kjetil Bjorvatnwhat now follows, we shall dig deeper and
study a firm’s choice between different forms
of FDI, notably the choice between greenfield
investment and acquisition.8
For the investing firm, an important
advantage with acquisition relative to green-
field is that an acquisition reduces the
competitive pressure in the market. This is
likely to increase profits through a higher price
on the firm’s output and perhaps a lower price
on its inputs. We would therefore expect
acquisitions to increase in importance in
markets where the competitive pressure
increases, for instance due to international
economic integration. The entry costs may
also be lower under acquisition than
greenfield. It is costly for a new firm not only
to set up a new production site, but also to
hire a new staff, to establish distribution
networks, and to acquire manufacturing skills
adapted to local conditions; a type of
infrastructure and information that an
existing firm is likely to have. Yet another
feature of acquisitions is that this mode of
entry allows quicker entry into a market
relative to greenfield. If, for strategic or other
reasons, the investing firm seeks a quick entry,
an acquisition may be the right choice. 
The most important advantage with a
greenfield investment is that it gives the
investing firm a higher degree of flexibility.
Acquiring another firm to a large extent also
means acquiring its technology, its staff, and
its organizational structure. Quite likely,
therefore, ownership advantages are easier to
transfer to a new venture. The greater techno-
logical and organizational flexibility of green-
field investments may also translate into lower
production costs. It is also possible that a firm
would be less inclined to transfer technology
and know-how to an acquired firm, since the
possibility of controlling the use of such
knowledge may be weaker in this case
compared to the case of a production unit
built from scratch. If internalization of
knowledge is important to a firm, it may favor
greenfield over acquisition. 
From this discussion, we would expect
greenfield to be relatively more important for
a firm with a technological edge over its
competitors. There may be three reasons for
this. First, a firm which possesses a strong
technological advantage over its competitors
may not be too worried about the competi-
tion, and therefore less inclined to choose
acquisition in order to reduce the competitive
pressure in the market. Second, a highly
efficient firm would tend to choose greenfield
in order to implement its technology in an
efficient manner. Third, greenfield may also
be chosen in order to protect its technology. 
Empirical evidence from OECD supports
this prediction. Greenfield is generally
preferred to acquisitions in countries and
sectors where the investing firm has a
technological and competitive advantage. For
example, Japanese MNEs entering Europe
have relied on greenfield in semiconductors
and transport in the UK, a sector where
Japanese firms have a technological edge over
their UK-counterparts. When entering the
European market for chemicals, on the other
hand, Japanese firms have chosen to acquire
existing firms in Germany and the
Netherlands. One likely reason for this
preference of acquisition over greenfield is the
fact that technologically, the European firms
in this sector are more on par with their
Japanese competitors, and therefore that the
need to internalize knowledge is less
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8.  For an analysis of a firm’s choice of entry mode, including the option of acquisition, see Bjorvatn (2000a) and
Norbäck and Persson (2000).important (Kang and Johansson, 2000). 
Earlier in this section we noted that an
important advantage with acquisitions is that
it is likely to reduce the competitive pressure
in the market. A reduction in the competitive
pressure is of course an advantage not only to
the acquiring firm but also to the other firms
in the market not involved in the acquisition.
In fact, theoretically speaking, it is typically
the case that “it is more profitable to be outside
a merger than to be a participant”, to quote
the influential article by Stigler (1950). In
other words, there may be a free-rider problem
associated with mergers and acquisitions:
While a merger is likely to increase aggregate
profits in an industry, no individual firm has
an incentive to take part in the merger. The
theory therefore predicts that mergers are not
likely to take place, at least not if we assume
that firms are profit maximizers. 
The reason why it may be more profitable
to be an outside firm relative to the merger,
can be explained as follows. Following the
merger, the merged firm uses its increased
market power to raise the price on its output.
The other firms respond to this price increase
by capturing market shares from the merged
firm. The outside firms therefore benefit both
from a higher price and larger market shares,
and are therefore better off than the merged
firm. Salant et al. (1983) demonstrate that in
the case of Cournot oligopoly with linear costs
and demand, a merger involving less than 80
percent of the industry will not be viable.
The theoretical analysis of mergers
typically assumes that firms are located in the
same market. Cross-border mergers and
acquisitions add another dimension to the
analysis, since an acquisition is now also a
means of market entry. In Bjorvatn (2001) I
demonstrate that cross-border mergers are
more likely to be profitable for the merging
parties than an intra-market merger. 
Economic integration and FDI
A large literature, theoretical and empirical,
analyses the effects of economic integration
on FDI.9Economic integration can be defined
as a reduction in transaction costs between
countries, on goods and factors of production,
and an international harmonization of
national legislation on trade and investment. 
A reduction of international transaction
costs can be due to political choice (as when
tariffs and non-tariff barriers are reduced,
international investors are granted national
treatment, countries sign international
dispute settlement treaties), or by techno-
logical change (as improved ways of shipping
goods bring down transportation costs and
the developments such as the Internet reduce
communication costs).
We shall distinguish between “global
integration”, for instance due to WTO-
agreements, and “regional integration”, as
exemplified by regional trade agreements such
as the EU and NAFTA.
Global integration
A reduction in international trade costs is
likely to increase the profitability of vertical
FDI, and reduce the profitability of
horizontal FDI. Recall that in the case of
vertical FDI, the most important L-
advantage was access to cheap and perhaps
well-qualified labor, the output mainly being
sold on the international market. Cheaper
access to the world market through a
reduction in trade costs makes such an
investment more profitable. In the case of
horizontal FDI, on the other hand, the prime
L-advantage was proximity to local
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9.  Two central contributions are Markusen and Venables (1996, 1998).consumers. As trade costs go down, the world
in a sense becomes smaller, and locating close
to final demand, i.e., the tariff-jumping
argument, becomes less important. Hence,
one should expect an increase in trade relative
to market-seeking FDI as trade costs go down
(at least if the foreign affiliate is not heavily
dependent on imported intermediates). 
Empirical evidence on the effects of
economic integration on FDI is mixed.
Brainard (1997) finds that a reduction in
trade costs causes a substitution away from
FDI and towards trade; i.e., a support of the
tariff jumping argument. Other empirical
studies suggest that economic integration has
had the opposite effect, namely causing an
increase in FDI. Feinberg et al. (1998) studies
trade liberalization between Canada and USA
in the 1980s and early 1990s, and report (on
page 771) that ‘’reductions in Canadian tariffs
actually increased capital and employment in
Canada by U.S. multinational companies.
Overall, trade liberalization appears to have
stimulated growth for the U.S. multinational
companies.’’ Given the open conclusion from
theory on the consequences of economic
integration on FDI, for instance, as discussed
above, depending on whether FDI is
horizontal or vertical, the mixed empirical
evidence is not surprising. 
Regional integration
So far, we have studied economic integration
as an overall reduction in international
transaction costs. Frequently, economic
integration takes place on a regional basis. In
this case, the effect on FDI also depends on
the response of firms located outside the
integrating region. 
Almost every country in the world belongs
to, or considers joining, a regional integration
arrangement, and 55 to 60 percent of world
trade now occurs within such trading blocs.10
Some of the most important agreements are
the European Economic Area, including the
EU and EFTA; NAFTA, with United States,
Canada and Mexico as participating
countries; ASEAN, involving Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei,
and Thailand; MERCOSUR, with Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay; and SADC,
which involves most countries in southern
Africa.
There are at least three reasons why
regional integration agreements should
increase FDI into the integrating region. First,
a reduction in intra-regional transaction costs
increases the effective market size of the
region, which in turn makes it a more
profitable area for foreign investment inflows.
Second, regional integration sometimes
involves an increase in trade barriers to the
outside world. From the tariff-jumping
argument, we know that such a policy can be
expected to increase investments into the
region. Third, many agreements feature
explicit dispute resolution mechanisms. If
effective, these should stimulate both FDI
and trade.
Note that an increase in FDI is not likely
to be evenly distributed between the
integration countries. Countries with the
strongest locational advantages are the ones
that are likely to attract FDI.
Regional integration agreements do not
necessarily increase extra-regional FDI.
Foreign firms that prior to the agreement were
already established in many of the integrating
countries may choose to rationalize their
operations by reducing the number of foreign
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Fernandez and Portes (1998) and Blomström and Kokko (1997b).affiliates in the region. Moreover, higher trade
barriers to the outside world would tend to
make efficiency seeking investments less
profitable. Similarly, if imported inter-
mediates are important in the foreign
affiliates’ production process, higher trade
costs may reduce the attractiveness of FDI.
Empirical research indicates that regional
integration on balance is likely to attract more
FDI into the region. For instance, there was a
considerable inflow of US direct investment
into the European Community after its
formation. Similarly, there was an upsurge in
Japanese investments in Europe as a conse-
quence of the 1992 common market program
(Blomström and Kokko, 1997b). 
Regional integration may have another
effect, which may perhaps be more important
in politically less stable developing countries.
Integration agreements, by raising reform
decisions from national to international
levels, may serve as a commitment to a policy
of liberalization and a signal to foreign
investors about this policy. As argued earlier,
this may have been the main benefit of
NAFTA for Mexico. 
Economic integration and FDI growth: 
A puzzle?
From the discussion in Section 1 we know
that the majority of FDI is market seeking, at
least in the OECD area. At first sight, then,
one should, following the tariff-jumping
argument, expect economic integration to
lead to a reduction in FDI, which is contrary
to what we observe. How do we explain the
rise in FDI in a period of increasing inter-
national economic integration?
One explanation would be that economic
integration not only involves a lowering of
trade costs. Other features associated with
integration may dominate the tariff jumping
argument and stimulate more horizontal FDI.
For instance, economic integration also
involves a liberalization and harmonization
of national rules and regulations on foreign
investment. Typically, a number of services,
such as banking, insurance and telecommuni-
cation, have been shielded from foreign
ownership. As a result of national initiatives
and international agreements, such as the
WTO-agreement on telecommunications
services that came into effect in 1998, a
number of services have been made accessible
for foreign ownership. It is possible that the
observed rise in FDI is simply the realization
of a potential that has been there for a long
time, but a potential which foreign investors
were previously prohibited from exploiting. 
Another feature of economic integration
is that international communication costs
have also gone down, particularly with the
possibility of transmitting electronic informa-
tion via Internet. Lower costs of communica-
tion makes coordination of decentralized
production easier, and may therefore
stimulate FDI. Economic integration may
also lead to higher world income and therefore
larger markets, which tends to increase
market-seeking FDI. 
Also factors not directly linked to
integration could make FDI more attractive
to firms. For instance, technological improve-
ments that reduce marginal production costs
tend to make other variable costs, such as
trade costs, relatively more important. Hence,
even though trade costs in absolute terms have
gone down, their relative importance in total
sales costs may have gone up, making it more
important for firms to locate closer to final
demand.
It is also possible to argue that a reduction
in trade costs as such may trigger an increase
in FDI. For instance, if the foreign affiliate is
highly dependent on imported intermediates,
a reduction in trade costs increases the
profitability of foreign production. This effect
may dominate the tariff-jumping argument,
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costs increases the profitability of trade
relative to FDI. Yet another argument is that
for strategic reasons, a reduction in trade costs
may trigger FDI. The reason is that a
reduction in trade costs, by making world
markets more accessible, also increases the
profitability of entry in a market. It may be in
the interest of incumbent firms to block such
entry in order to keep competition at a
minimum. One way of doing this is to invest
abroad, thereby reducing marginal sales costs.
If the potential entrant observes that the
established firm has low sales costs, it knows
that competition in case of entry will be
tough. The response of the potential entrant
may therefore be not to enter, and the
incumbent firm has achieved what it set out
to do. Hence, the optimal strategy for the
incumbent firm as a response to lower trade
costs may be FDI (Ganslandt, 1998). 
It may also be true that a reduction in trade
cost increases the host country benefits of
FDI. If this is the case, one might expect
countries to become more positive towards
hosting multinationals, and stimulate
increased FDI by implementing FDI-friendly
policies. The reason is basically as follows. In
markets of imperfect competition, it may be
beneficial for a country to grant its industry
some degree of protection from foreign
competitors in order to avoid too much profit
ending up in the pockets of foreign owners.
High trade costs may provide exactly this kind
of protection when the foreign firm is an
exporter. A lowering of trade costs increases
the competitiveness of a foreign exporter,
thereby weakening the protectionist argu-
ment for keeping the foreign firm at a distance
from the local market. The host country
benefits of FDI, including increased
consumer surplus and technological spillover
effects, may then dominate the protectionist
argument for dealing with the foreign firm as
an exporter. The result may be a change in
attitude towards FDI on the part of host
countries, which may lead to more FDI taking
place (Bjorvatn, 2000). 
We also know that most of the recent surge
in FDI has been in the form of acquisitions.
Reduced international trade costs offers one
explanation to this development. By intensi-
fying international competition, lower trade
costs may force companies to act in order to
maintain the profitability of the firm.
Focusing on core activities by selling out
peripheral operations and purchasing opera-
tions closer to the main line of operations may
cut costs. In addition, as argued above,
acquiring international competitors may
increase profits by reducing the competitive
pressure in the market. Hence, pressure on
profits caused by reduced trade barriers may
stimulate cross-border mergers and acquisi-
tions.
Evaluation
Theoretical studies have typically been
concerned with the positive question; why do
firms choose FDI rather than alternative
modes of servicing foreign markets, such as
exports? Host country effects of FDI and
policy implications have received less
attention.11 One possible reason for this
relative neglect may be the consensus that
appears to prevail today that FDI is good for
host economies, and that the challenge for
host economies is simply to attract more of it. 
Even in less developed countries, where
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Reis (2001).the skepticism against multinational
companies and FDI has traditionally been
widespread, the general attitude now seems
to be far more positive. For instance,
UNCTAD (1999b) reports that: ‘’Foreign
direct investment is welcomed and, indeed,
actively sought by virtually all African
countries.’’ While it may well be true that FDI
on balance is beneficial to host economies,
the picture is not so clear from a theoretical
viewpoint at least. Particularly when host
countries are less advanced, the impact of FDI
can be expected to be great, and not
necessarily positive.
Positive effects
Foreign entry may increase competition in the
domestic product market and benefit domestic
consumers by lowering prices and by adding
new product varieties to the market. In the
factor market, increased competition is likely
to increase wages and reduce unemployment.
A foreign firm is likely to possess ideas and
knowledge that differ from those of local firms,
and can therefore be expected to add more to
competition than entry by a domestic firm.
Similarly, foreign firms are not likely to be part
of local, informal business networks aimed at
sustaining a situation of “gentlemanly compe-
tition.” Foreign entry may therefore create
more turbulence than domestic entry and thus
have a stronger pro-competitive effect (Caves,
1971).
Job creation may take place not only in
the foreign affiliates. Local suppliers of
intermediate goods may enter the market and
existing ones expand their output and
employment in the face of increased demand
for such products from the foreign entrant. 
In less developed host countries, MNEs
may also provide valuable services in assisting
local firms to reach OECD markets with their
products. Services include design, packaging,
distribution, and financial services. 
FDI may generate tax revenues to host
governments, at least if the MNEs are not
offered extensive tax holidays, and bring
added supply of foreign currency, given that
the foreign affiliates produce for international
markets. In this way, FDI may reduce the
“twin deficits” plaguing many countries in
the world, namely the budget deficit and
current account deficit. FDI may also
stimulate economic growth by adding capital
to the economy. Particularly in poor countries
that may not have easy access to international
credit markets, FDI may be an important
source of capital accumulation.
The positive effect of FDI that has received
the most attention in the literature is the
potential for technological spillover effects.
For most economies, MNEs are an important
source of technology. Even though MNEs
through FDI keep a stronger control over its
technology, relative to say licensing agree-
ments, there may be significant spillovers
from MNE to local firms. 
Spillovers may lead to a reduction in the
home firms’ production costs over time.
Exactly how foreign entry affects local firm
production costs is of course an empirical
question, and a very difficult one to answer.
Spillovers may be channeled via the labor
market, as local workers are trained in the
foreign firm and later take their acquired
knowledge to domestic firms. For instance,
there are several case studies demonstrating
that MNEs train workers and managers who
are later employed by local firms. In this case,
FDI, i.e., the local presence of foreign
production, may be a precondition for local
learning.
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that
the spillover intensity from FDI may depend
negatively on the technology gap between
local and foreign firms (Blomström, 1986,
Cantwell, 1989, Kokko et al., 1996). In order
to learn from foreign firm technology, the
26 Kjetil Bjorvatntechnology employed by the foreign firm
must, so to speak, be within the reach of local
firms. As an example, Kokko (1994) shows
that there are few signs of spillovers in
Mexican industries where the foreign affiliates
have much higher productivity and larger
market shares than local firms.
Finally, being exposed to (foreign)
competition may force the domestic firm,
which in the pre-liberalization enjoyed a
protected monopoly position, to reduce
organizational and technological inefficien-
cies, so-called X-inefficiencies. On the basis
of a study of industry in six developing
countries, Bergsman (1974) argues that
internal inefficiency is several times as
important as “external” inefficiencies caused
by monopolistic pricing in the output market. 
Negative effects
While FDI may increase competition in the
host market, this is not necessarily the case.
Moreover, increased competition need not be
a positive thing for the host country.
Regarding the first point, whether or not FDI
leads to increased competition, we should
note that the mode of entry is likely to be
important. Entry in the form of an acquisition
may simply be a change in ownership, for
instance replacing one domestic monopolist
with a foreign one. Clearly, consumers need
not be affected by this kind of FDI. Indeed, if
the foreign firm prior to the acquisition
supplied the market through exports, the
acquisition reduces the degree of competition
in the host market and probably harms
consumers.
Regarding the second point, namely that
increased competition not necessarily is a
good thing for the host country, note that any
improvement in consumer surplus must be
weighed against reduced profits for locally
owned firms. Since MNEs generally operate
in oligopolistic markets, there may be a
substantial potential for profit shifting due to
foreign entry. Theoretically, at least, the loss
in domestic profits may well dominate the
gain for domestic consumers. In the extreme
case of profit-shifting, the foreign entrant may
act as a predator, eliminating local producers
from the market.
Looking at the effects of MNEs on
concentration in 46 Malaysian industries, Lall
(1979) concluded that the presence of foreign
firms tended to increase concentration.
Similar results have been reported in Mexico
(Kokko, 1994). The evidence therefore
suggests that there is a larger risk that MNCs
crowd out local firms in LDCs than in
developed countries.
The danger that foreign firms may replace
weak domestic firms is however, relevant also
in the more developed parts of the world. It
has been suggested that the entry of US firms
in European markets has increased
competition in the industries where local
firms had some traditional technological
strength, whereas local firms in other
industries – and especially in countries where
markets were too small to allow both kinds of
firms to operate at efficient scale – were forced
out of business or pushed to market segments
that were ignored by the foreign MNEs
(Cantwell, 1989).
There is also a danger that a foreign
takeover will lead to a closing down of the
local headquarters and R&D operations,
concentrating these activities in the country
of the parent firm. Such a move took place in
connection with foreign takeovers in the
Brazilian car industry (UNCTAD, 1999a:
40). The effect on the host economy may be
negative, since R&D may have important
spillovers to the rest of the economy. 
Policy implications
What kind of FDI should a country try to
attract, and what can the country do in order
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generate both static and dynamic gains for
the host economies. The static benefits of FDI
include a reduction in macroeconomic
imbalances such as unemployment, govern-
ment budget deficits, and current account
deficits, and improved resource allocation
through increased competition in local
markets. FDI may also generate long-run
growth effects, by adding to the capital stock
in the host economy, and in particular by
adding to its stock of technology and know-
how through spillovers.
The effect on competition is likely to be
larger if the investment is in the form of a
greenfield rather than acquisition, and if it is
horizontal rather than vertical. The effect on
job creation and the twin deficits is likely to
be stronger if the foreign affiliate purchases a
significant share of its intermediates locally,
rather than through imports. Significant
government income is conditioned on the
MNEs not being granted generous tax
holidays.
Technological spillovers are likely to be
stronger if the foreign affiliate uses a techno-
logy that is somewhat more advanced than
that of local firms, but where the technology
gap is not too large. Spillovers are also likely
to be more important the stronger are the
linkages to the local economy. Linkages are
likely to be more important the larger is the
share of locally supplied intermediates, the
larger is the share of skilled workers employed
locally, and the closer geographically the
foreign affiliates are to local firms.
Potential host country governments face a
dilemma. In order to get the most out of a
foreign affiliate, they may wish to place a
number of conditions on FDI, including local
joint venture partners, local content require-
ments, limits on expatriate personnel, com-
pulsory licensing and other forms of manda-
tory technology transfers. Such restrictions
on firms intended to encourage technology
transfer may however backfire. Firms may
simply choose not to invest in a country with
numerous conditionalities tied to the invest-
ment, as the above mentioned case of Coca-
Cola in India shows. 
In practice, the bargaining power of host
economies may be fairly limited. Given that
MNEs can choose between a number of
countries in which to invest, potential host
countries may find themselves involved in an
international tax competition situation,
where countries overbid each other in terms
of incentives to attract FDI. The result of such
a “race to the bottom” may be that host
countries gain very little from FDI. Inter-
national investment agreements are probably
required in order to reduce such problems.12
Perhaps the most important asset for a
country, not only for attracting FDI but also
for increasing the potential for economic
growth, is a highly skilled and highly
motivated labor force. Such an asset is
attractive for firms irrespective of whether the
aim of the investment is to supply the local
market or international markets. Moreover,
education policies may enhance the capacity
to absorb foreign technologies once an
investment has been made, thereby increasing
the spillover effects to the local economy.
Regional integration provides foreign
investors with access to a larger market and
may service as a commitment to a set of liberal
and business-friendly policies. This may spur
increased investment from abroad. It should
however be noted that regional integration
also increases the attractiveness of neigh-
boring countries that are also members of the
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12. See for instance Oman (2000).integration agreement. A lowering of trade
costs between countries may lead to a
relocation of industries, possibly resulting in
a core-periphery outcome in which the core-
countries attract both intra-regional and
extra-regional investment, the periphery-
countries ending up as losers from the
integration process.
An important location advantage for a
country in terms of attracting FDI (and, of
course, for stimulating business in general), is
a well-developed infrastructure. Good
infrastructure, widely defined to include both
physical infrastructure such as roads, ports,
international airports, as well as institutional
infrastructure including a well functioning
and honest bureaucracy, reduces transaction
costs and therefore increases the profitability
of doing business in the country.
Macroeconomic stability is clearly an
important factor determining a country’s
attractiveness for foreign investors. Blom-
ström and Kokko (1997b: 38) conclude that
for the MERCOSUR area, at least, “macro-
economic stability appears to be a more
important determinant of FDI inflows than
is regional integration.” Argentina, which is a
much smaller economy than that of Brazil,
experienced large inflows of FDI even before
the effective implementation of the
MERCOSUR agreement, largely due to
macroeconomic reforms that brought down
inflation and interest rates, and secured the
convertibility of the local currency. Similarly,
in Europe, while membership in the EU
(then; EC) brought large increases of FDI to
Spain and Portugal, Greece was marginalized
in terms of FDI inflows, basically because its
macroeconomic policies proved unattractive
to foreign investors.
Many countries discriminate between
vertical and horizontal FDI, promoting the
former and discouraging the latter. Malaysia,
for instance, has been very successful in
attracting firms to its Export Processing
Zones. Such zones grant firms a number of
advantages, including tax holidays, zero or
low tariffs on imported intermediates,
property rights over land, streamlined
application procedures, etc. The country is
however much more restrictive when it comes
to allowing entry of multinationals wishing
to service the local Malaysian market. For
instance, there are local participation rules
attached to market-seeking investments,
including minimum domestic ownership
shares and local management requirements. 
Restrictions on horizontal FDI are
understandable and can in certain cases be
defended on economic grounds by reference
to the problem of profit shifting, for instance
in the form of the infant industry argument.
But the implementation of such policies
requires a great deal of knowledge about
supply and demand in specific markets,
knowledge that governments are not likely to
have, and which can perhaps be obtained only
at great cost. Moreover, given that market
characteristics change over time, for instance
due to technological progress, policies must
change as well. This requires a degree of
political autonomy and flexibility that
governments typically do not have. For
instance, the infant industry argument is an
argument for a temporary protection of an
industry. But given that such a policy has been
introduced, special interest groups are likely
to form to secure the continuation of the
policy. The result could be a permanent
protection of the industry, which might well
reduce rather than increase the competitive-
ness of local firms. 
Foreign firms in export processing zones
typically have few links with the local
economy, and the potential spillover effects
may therefore be limited. Export-oriented
investors are often less willing to establish
links with local companies because of the need
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in order to compete in world markets. 
This tendency is exacerbated by the fact
that the host governments often promote
sectors such as electronics in which there are
no pre-existing indigenous capabilities and
hence no potential local suppliers. In
addition, of course, given the tax and tariff
exemptions, there may be little tax revenues
to collect from these MNEs. Thomsen (1999:
27), analyzing the case of the ASEAN4
countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand, argues that the
emphasis of host countries on export
promotion is unwise: 
Not only have exports been limited to a
small number of products, usually
intermediate ones, and sectors, the export
sectors have also tended to be virtual
foreign enclaves within host countries.
They have often been characterized by low
value-added (principally from labour-
intensive assembly operations) and a poor
record of technology transfers. Many of
the most successful export sectors in the
ASEAN4 are highly import dependent,
and this has limited the impact of massive
devaluations in these economies on
exports. In some sectors, imports represent
80-90 percent of the value of exports. The
high import dependence for MNE-related
exports is symptomatic of the poor
linkages between foreign affiliates and the
local economy more generally. Poor
linkages reduce the scope for technology
transfers through FDI which could assist
in local industrial upgrading. Arguably,
the failure to upgrade production in light
of greater competition in labour-intensive
activities from China and Vietnam is one
of the underlying structural problems
which served to undermine confidence in
the years preceding the crisis.
Concluding remarks
During the last two decades we have witnessed
a radical increase in FDI. Most FDI flows take
place between countries in the OECD area,
but increasingly countries outside this area
are hosting foreign owned production.
Factors such as the size of the local market,
the quality and price of local labor, the quality
of physical and social infrastructure, and
macroeconomic stability are important
location advantages that may attract FDI. 
It is evident that FDI may contribute
greatly to the host economy. In Taiwan and
Singapore, where educational standards and
infrastructure are well developed, foreign
investment has spawned many local suppliers,
competitors and service firms, including
independent indigenous enterprises that are
highly successful in world markets and that
have, in some cases, become multinationals
themselves. 
Foreign ownership is however not a
precondition for economic growth. South
Korea experienced rapid economic growth
during the 1980s and until the financial crisis
in the late 1990s, relying largely on domestic
technology and domestic ownership. Korean
entrepreneurs were encouraged to unbundle
foreign packages of technology and adapt
them to local conditions, a process known as
reverse engineering. Moreover, Korean firms
were guided by their foreign customers on
designs and production and management
techniques. Evidently, learning can take place
through local R&D and contact with
demanding customers, and does not require
the local presence of multinational firms
(Rhee et al, 1984).
Still, other countries relying on local
capabilities, such as India, have not been as
successful as South Korea in generating long
term growth. The reason may be that
successful implementation of protectionist
policies requires a degree of political
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ments do not have. Policies that at the time of
implementation may well have been sensible
become locked in through the pressure of
special interest groups, and over time become
incompatible with economic growth and
development.
Although the general attitude towards FDI
today is very positive, foreign entry is not
necessarily a blessing for the host country.
Particularly if the host country is a less
developed one, the impact of FDI may be
great, both positive and negative. Foreign
firms may be a lot more effective than local
firms. If they compete on the same market,
the foreign firm is likely to capture significant
market shares from the local firms, possibly
eliminating local firms altogether. Certainly,
foreign firms may be a valuable source of
technology to less advanced countries. But
empirical research suggests that if the
technological gap is too great, the ability of
the local firms to learn much from its foreign
competitor is limited. Following this
reasoning, it may be beneficial for less
advanced countries to expose their markets to
firms which are not radically more advanced
than themselves, which could be interpreted
as an argument in favor of South-South
integration.
Given the general wish to attract FDI,
countries may start competing against each
other in order to do so. Such competition
need of course not be wasteful. For instance,
improvements in infrastructure and educa-
tional programs that strengthen a country’s
locational advantages are productive invest-
ments. Other forms of competition are not
productive, however. Tax competition may
lead to a race to the bottom and undermine
the governments’ ability to perform impor-
tant functions, such as the provision of health
care and redistribution of income. There may
be a need for international agreements on FDI
in order to avoid such tax competition, and
to ensure that the benefits of FDI are shared
fairly between the MNE and the host country. 
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